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Indexing concepts and/or named
entities
Pino Buizza
Indexing process, considered in any of its forms, produces concep-
tual representations of documents and information retrieval systems,
that is to say the ways to find documents for their conceptual value.
Otherwise, searching by words or by sequences of characters, either
in full texts or in formal records, retrieves the phrases through which
thoughts are recorded in documents. Also traditional indexing uses
terms that do not properly denote concepts: proper names denoting
unique entities. By examining the nature and the value of proper
names, and of the entities that they name, this study aims at under-
standing their place in assigned indexing, and whether it is simply
comparable to that of concept terms, or if any difference requires
different treatments.
Morphology
The couple “concept or named entity” appears in the principle of
the uniform heading, the first of IFLA’s Principles underlying subject
heading languages (SHLs) (1999). The principle refers to both elements
in the same way. In the naming principle, “names of persons, places,
families, corporate bodies and works” are mentioned to recommend
the use of the same form used in author and title catalogues. No
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other difference is stated between the two elements of the couple.
Therefore, it is assumed, and actually commonly practiced in al-
phabetical subject indexing, that named entities have a separate
treatment in authority control systems or authority files. This affects
only the vocabulary, the form of headings, the morphology or formal
side of indexing. As a matter of fact, even within these limits, the
issue is not so simple, for a couple of reasons. First, because the
access points created for descriptive cataloguing, and the entities
that they represent, always stand by themselves; while in subject
indexing, due to the complexity of the theme of a work, the same
entities may be linked to other terms in a string and incorporated in
a phrase. An issue may raise: whether a personal name has to main-
tain the inverted form or to assume the direct one when it is not the
entry word (e.g. Romantic drama – Influence by Shakespeare, William,
or – Influence by William Shakespeare).1 Moreover, not every named
entity is represented in name authority files. The criteria used to
choose the form of the name for persons and corporate bodies that
are not responsible for any work or expression (e.g. Alexander the
Great), may be the same suggested by the cataloguing rules. Ob-
jects, equally not recorded in name authority files (e.g. Venus de
Milo), have no criteria at all in cataloguing rules; thus, their names
should be chosen according to reference sources or other controlled
lists, and to general criteria for preferred form of terms in controlled
vocabularies.
1The form preferred by Nuovo soggettario is the first one, see the example: Influssi
[di] Ovidius Naso, Publius (Biblioteca nazionale centrale di Firenze, Nuovo soggettario:
Guida al sistema italiano di indicizzazione per soggetto, Prototipo del Thesaurus p. 123); the
brackets divide the two terms. This is not the case for Library of Congress Subject
Headings (LCSH) and Répertoire d’autorité-matière encyclopédique et alphabétique
unifié (RAMEAU), where the subject is broken into two separate headings.
4707E-2
JLIS.it. Vol. 2, n. 2 (Dicembre/December 2011)
Different features
Apart from these preliminaries, in the present paper my main
interest, is not in the form of the names. The real question is concep-
tual, not formal: with regard to the theory and the models of subject
indexing, which are the differences between concepts and named
entities? If there are any. In this paper I will try a simple analysis of
concepts and named entities, to test their nature and the correctness
of their separation or identification.
«Concept is a unit of thought. It is formed by mentally combin-
ing some or all of the characteristics of a concrete or abstract, real
or imaginary object», or by abstracting the common characteristics
of similar concrete or abstract, real or imaginary objects. «Concepts
exist in the mind as abstract entities independent of terms used to
express them» and of the concrete or abstract, real or imaginary
nature of the object(s) that generated them (ANSI/NISO Z39.19-2005.
Guidelines for the Construction, Format, and Management of Monolingual
Controlled Vocabularies 4.1).2 Named entities have the double char-
acteristic of being unique entities and being identified by a proper
name (named). Named entities are not named in the standards
for thesaurus construction. Unique entities and proper names are
treated there in a marginal way: their inclusion in the thesaurus is
not necessary, the control of their form is necessary but not ruled,
and they appear in the instance relationships (ANSI/NISO Z39.19-
2005. Guidelines for the Construction, Format, and Management of Mono-
lingual Controlled Vocabularies2.3; 6.3.3; 6.6.7; 8.3.2; ISO/CD 25694-1.
Thesauri and Interoperability with other Vocabularies. Pt. 1: Thesauri for
Information Retrieval 7.6.9; 11.2.4).
Following the classical lesson of Ranganathan (Prolegomena to
2This definition is consistent with that of ISO 2788, stating more concisely: «a
unit of thought», and that of BS 8723 and ISO 25694-1, confirming the brief form and
adding the second quoted sentence as a note.
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Library Classification), three planes can be considered: the idea plane,
the verbal plane and the notational plane. On the first, each unique
entity is an instance of the class to which it belongs; it shares the
specificities of the class with the other members, but not its own
accidental characteristics, its identity. The concept is the class of
these individuals and is defined by shared characteristics. On the
verbal plane, natural languages use common nouns for concepts,
for sets of individuals and for unique not identified individuals
(generally with indeterminate article, if different kinds of article are
available); while for identified individuals they use common nouns
with determinate article or with other determiners that are enough
in the context, or definite descriptions, or, at last, proper names.
Aiming at effective searching, controlled verbal indexing languages
formalise both common nouns and proper names in uniform and
univocal ways. This is carried out by means of authority control
and equivalence relationships between different terms or names for
the same entity or different forms of terms or names. The terms for
concepts are chosen from subject headings lists or from thesauri,
with the semantic value of common nouns and the implicit or explicit
stipulation of hierarchical and associative relationships between
concepts. Proper names for authors and other named entities are
chosen following cataloguing rules or reference works or convenient
customs. No other link than references between different forms of
names for the same unique entity is stipulated.
The notational plane is typical of classification systems and does
not apply to subject headings. For the latter, the syntactic plane may
be considered in an extensive analogy: complex subjects are formally
and consistently represented by building pre-coordinate strings. In
this regard, systems based on the specificity principle favour the
treatment of a unique entity as the core or key element in a complex
subject. Their syntax distinguishes the concepts (which may be sub-
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divisions), and named entities (which are usually excluded, except
geographic entities). Systems based on terms and strings and on log-
ical roles treat both without any difference.3 Another difference may
be found in bibliographic formats (both MARC21 and UNIMARC),
where different codes are provided for entities whose instances are
typically denoted by proper names (personal names, corporate body
names, family names, names and titles, titles, geographical names as
subjects in fields 600-602, 604-605 e 607 of UNIMARC bibliographic).
The use of these fields instead of the generic “topical name” (606), is
devoted just to named entities, not to the corresponding categories
of concepts, which include, for example for persons, any kind of
qualification, such as professional, social conditions, etc. (e.g. engi-
neers, the poor). Notes on field contents acknowledge a different
use from that “for persons responsible for the content of an item”,
as terms may be added to further specify form, topic, place or time.
Named entities and proper names
However, the correspondence between named entities and proper
names is not exact. There are unique entities represented by a non-
absolute proper name. Depending on the higher or lower perception
of the individual personality within a certain category of entities,
which is the reason why a proper name is received, there are unique
entities represented by a proper name in association with a com-
mon noun denoting the class to which it belongs (e.g., hurricanes:
Hurricane Charlie!); or by a noun phrase consisting of a common
noun plus other distinguishing elements, for instance place and
time definitions (e.g., the earthquake in Haiti on Jan. 2010, formally:
3The difference is typically shown confronting the provisions of old Soggettario,
with subdivisions for biographic headings, and Nuovo soggettario, where persons’
logic role is analysed to fix their place in the string.
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Earthquake – Haiti – 2010, Jan. 12). On the contrary, some proper
names represent a plurality, not a unique entity, but are often con-
sidered single entities, as they are often treated as such, and works
about one instance are unusual. They are mass-produced items,
considered to be a single model, but consisting of sets of identical
and separate objects (e.g., Automobile Citroen 2cv is not the same
as my Citroen 2cv, number plate AZ175NJ...); biological species, be-
ing the class of plants or animals with similar features and able to
reproduce (e.g., Leontopodium Alpinum or Edelweiss, the name
of all the flowers of this species); and recurring time entities, con-
sidered to be one entity for their typical permanent characteristics,
but actually instantiated many times, at each recurrence (Christ-
mas vs. Christmas 2009, 2010. . . ). Specific types of material or of
uncountable products may have a proper name, generally accom-
panied by a common noun. For example, “Chianti” or “Bordeaux”
are the proper names of the regions of origin of the wine, so that
they are properly called “Chianti wine” and “Bordeaux wine”, while
the olive oil of the same region is not called Chianti olive oil, but
olive oil from Chianti, and, in a formal language, Olive oil – Italy –
Chianti. In verbal indexing languages, the presence of a common
noun (hurricane, earthquake, automobile, wine) associated to the
proper name assures the insertion of the term into the class and the
semantic net to which it belongs; while, the proper names that re-
main absolute are maintained isolated from their class and semantic
context: Leontopodium Alpinum and Christmas do not appear as
flowers and feasts.
Linguistics
In linguistics the differences between common nouns and proper
names have been carefully studied. A wide range of different char-
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acteristics has been pointed out, in grammar and in syntax, as well
as in current usage and in interlinguistic practice (for example in
translation and transcription). The syntactical behaviour of proper
names closely corresponds to personal and demonstrative pronouns
due to their anaphoric value. Difficulties arise in defining some
categories of names, and whether they should be considered proper
or common names – like in a continuum between two polarities, in
which there is an intermediate area where it is difficult to establish a
boundary. This is the case, for example, of monoreferential expres-
sions, like the moon and the earth, the names of chemical elements,
currencies, months and periods of time, languages, diseases, etc.
(gold, Deutschmark, February, Spanish, Aids). Leaving out linguis-
tic details, which are beyond our competence, as well as hybrid and
intermediate situations that would complicate the problem, let us fo-
cus on clear-cut types of proper names and particularly on semantic
aspects – the most interesting in a discussion about subject indexing
and knowledge organisation.
Philosophy of language
A long lasting exciting debate among philosophers of language,
semiologists, linguists has lead us to focus on two opposite posi-
tions: the meaninglessness and the meaningfulness (or descriptivist)
thesis. On one hand, the name of a unique entity – its proper name
– is considered meaningless, it is only a referent, a way to denote
the entity without saying anything about it. A proper name has
only denotation and no connotative property. As J. S. Mill claimed:
«Proper names are not connotative: they denote the individuals who
are called by them; but they do not indicate or imply any attributes
as belonging to those individuals. When we name a child by the
name Paul, or a dog by the name Caesar, these names are simply
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marks used to enable those individuals to be made subjects of dis-
course». «We put a mark, not indeed upon the object itself, but,
so to speak, upon the idea of the object. A proper name is but an
unmeaning mark which we connect in our minds with the idea of
the object, in order to whenever the mark meets our eyes or occurs to
our thoughts, we may think of that individual object». «All concrete
general names are connotative. The word man, for example, denotes
Peter, Jane, John, and an indefinite number of individuals, of whom,
taken as a class, it is the name. But it is applied to them, because
they possess, and to signify that they possess, certain attributes»
(Mill, A System of Logic, Ratiocinative and InductiveI, Ch. II, § 5). On
the other hand, many different levels of meaningfulness have been
attributed to proper names. To mention only a few, Gottlob Frege
assigned a sense (Sinn) to proper names too. Something between
the proper name’s reference (the object itself) and the subjective
representations we may have of the object, and «opinions as to the
sense may differ» («können freilich die Meinungen über den Sinn
auseinandergehen») (“Uber Sinn und Bedeutung”); a sense which
sometimes includes a lexical meaning, but rather comparable to an
associative (pragmatic) meaning. Edmund Husserl argued for a one-
to-one correspondence between extension (reference) and intension
(meaning) (Logische Untersuchungen II, 1), without explaining the
nature of this proprial intension, and how we can define it. Bertrand
Russell considered proper names to be truncated or shorthand de-
scriptions (Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy ch. 16). In Ludwig
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus the name means the
object, that is to say that proper names merely denote. But in late
Philosophische Untersuchungen the meaning of a proper name is
constituted by the description one can provide of the thing named,
not by the referent: in this way the meaning is not fixed. John R.
Searle recognises that proper names do not have definitions, and the
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descriptions are assigned to the name bearers only: proper names
«function not as descriptions, but as pegs on which to hang descrip-
tions». They «are logically connected with characteristics of the
object to which they refer ‘in a loose sort of way’» (“Proper Names”
170-2). The relation with a common noun is not a definite descrip-
tion, but merely a description or predicate (Everest is a mountain),
providing a criterion of identity. And in Speech acts a distinction
of functions is inserted: «the essential fact ... is that we have the
institution of proper names to perform the speech act of identifying
reference. The existence of these expressions derives from our need
to separate the referring from the predicating functions of language»
(Speech Acts 174). Saul Kripke restored the meaninglessness thesis: a
proper name functions as a rigid designator if it has been assigned to
a referent and passed on to other users; proper names are connected
with their referents through a causal chain of references from an
initial baptismal act, when the reference was assigned by ostension
and/or description (“Naming and Necessity”).
Semantic linguistics
From a linguistic point of view, Willy Van Langendonck says
that the right question is «in what way the meanings are constructed
and function», not whether proper names have a meaning or not.
«In common nouns the meaning crucially determines the denota-
tum, in proper names, the meaning helps to retrieve an already
given denotatum. For practical reasons, we can still call the meaning
of common nouns ‘conventional meaning’, that of proper names
‘associative meaning’. Moreover, both word classes do also show
grammatical meaning» (38). «The traditional notions of intension
and extension (reinterpreted cognitively) are necessary to distin-
guish proper names from common nouns. In proper names the
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extension determines the intension whereas in common nouns it is
the other way round» (56). Van Langendonck’s tentative conclusions
on the meaning of proper names are the following (84-86):
• proper names do not have asserted lexical meaning;
however, if presuppositional information can be called ‘mean-
ing’:
• proper names do have presuppositional meaning:
– categorical meaning, at the level of established linguistic
convention (man, woman),
– associative meaning, at the level of language use (from
the description of the referent or from the form of the
name),
– emotive meaning (augmentative, diminutive),
– grammatical meaning (definiteness, number, gender);
• the referent of proper names is a mental referent in the first
palce, even for referents in the real world.
The proposed definition of proper name:
A proper name is a noun that denotes a unique entity at the
level of established linguistic convention to make it psychoso-
cially salient within a given basic level category [pragmatic].
The meaning of a name, if any, does not (or not any longer) de-
termine its denotation [semantic]. An important formal reflex
of this pragmatic-semantic characterization of proper names is
their ability to appear in such close appositional constructions
as the poet Burns, Fido the dog, the River Thames, or the City of
London [syntactic]. (87)
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According to this linguistic analysis, which accepts the challenge
of philosophy of language, even in the meaningfullness position a
proper name is not like a term for a concept. It has no definition,
while a concept has a definition. Its referent is unique, it can be
described in many different ways, none of which is exhaustive; a
concept is an abstraction from the features of a plurality of individu-
als. A definite description of the referent is a different function of
the language from the referring function of the proper name. The
denotatum of a proper name is given before its description and
needs no definition to be determined. Basically, it is the mental
referent, rather than the object in the real-world. Thus, a proper
name representing a unique entity lacks the features of a common
noun or noun phrase typically representing a concept. Some of these
linguistic remarks may appear irrelevant in a discourse on indexing
languages: the former apply to natural languages and their free ex-
pression in communication, the latter formalise terms and their use
adopting rigidly controlled morphology and semantics, in a poor
syntax. Nevertheless, some outcomes are useful for the following,
specific sections.
Indexing languages
From the point of view of indexing languages, both concepts
and named entities can be the aboutness of a work and their pre-
ferred terms or proper nouns are used in indexing systems. The
difference is that the former can be related to one another (like in a
thesaurus), according to the semantic relationships between their
concepts, which are considered permanent as they are deduced
from their definitions and generally from lexical meaning, not from
chance associations within the development of a discourse. The lat-
ter have only a relationship to the category of their presuppositional
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meaning, while asserted associations to other nouns or names per-
tain to autobiographic episodic memory and to language use. The
former easily gain a place and role in knowledge organisation; the
latter are exposed to different assertions about them, to the different
mental images of their referents, for different people, in different
contexts. Works about a named entity, even if focused on the same
referent, are particularly suitable to give different descriptions and
assertions.
In thesauri and subject indexing systems the instance relation-
ship is typically used to connect a proper name to a term for the
category of persons, or places, or things, etc. of which a named
entity is an example, remarking that it is a hierarchical relationship
neither generic nor partitive (ANSI/NISO Z39.19-2005. Guidelines for
the Construction, Format, and Management of Monolingual Controlled
Vocabularies8.3.2; ISO/CD 25694-1. Thesauri and Interoperability with
other Vocabularies. Pt. 1: Thesauri for Information Retrieval 11.2.4). But,
is it a real semantic relationship (a priori, independent from circum-
stances and documents) (ISO 2788. Guidelines for the Establishment
and Development of Monolingual ThesauriIntroduction), or is it only
a good device to collect individuals and make their overall recall
easier, without making a survey by name of the members of the
category? Only the basic categorical presupposition should be per-
manent and context independent; but linguistic analysis shows that
there is an appropriate level stated by linguistic conventions that,
just for persons, is not “man/woman” but a more specific one, e.g.
the nationality, profession, etc., that, for the same person, can change
or be not pertinent in another context. If an instance relationship is
established at a more specific level, this raises the issue of whether a
proper name is allowed to have more than one instance relationship
and to produce a polyhierarchy (e.g., Carla Bruni as an instance of
models and/or of first ladies; Ronald Regan as an instance of actors
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and/or of presidents of USA). In a system adopting polyhierarchies
for generic relationships, of course they are allowed to be adopted
for instance relationships too. In order to avoid inconsistencies in
relationships, another way has been proposed, without using poly-
hierachies (GRIS, Gruppo di ricerca sull’indicizzazione per soggetto
3.4.4.3). Since the categories for persons are not permanent, but
actually are fixed by the focus of the aboutness of works about per-
sons, in the vocabulary no instance relationship is established, and
a syntactic relationship represents the instance directly in the sub-
ject string for that work. In the subject heading the proper name is
not recorded alone, but following the term for the category apt to
contextualise it (e.g., p. 88: Architetti: Bernini, Gian Lorenzo, while
for other works we could have: Scultori: Bernini, Gian Lorenzo, or
simply: Bernini, Gian Lorenzo). Introducing a sort of classified style,
this solution is in contrast with the traditional principle of specific
subject heading: it is a way to give a proper name a meaningfullness
that it does not have by its own, and to avoid linking a name with
a profession for ever, even when this is not the matter. This option
has not been adopted in Nuovo Soggettario, whose base and many
choices are founded just on Guida all’indicizzazione per soggetto. The
thesaurus of Nuovo Soggettario proposes «only as examples, some
terms that can be considered proper names, such as names of wines,
cheeses, breeds of dogs, some historical events» («solo a titolo esem-
plificativo, alcuni termini che possono ritenersi nomi propri, come
nomi di vini, di formaggi, di razze di cani, di alcuni eventi storici»,
App. A, p. 201). The problem of inserting named entities into the
net of meanings of an indexing system remains, and it is only partly
reduced by the presence in strings for proper names of common
nouns specifying the meaningful aspect of the named entity consid-
ered in the work (e.g., Buonarroti, Michelangelo – Pittura (Biblioteca
nazionale centrale di Firenze, Nuovo soggettario: Guida al sistema ital-
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iano di indicizzazione per soggetto, Prototipo del Thesaurus 4.4.2.1.6)).
The distinction of the kinds of name used as subject that is found in
the fields of MARC formats and is mentioned above, appears only
formally useful (in morphology), even if an advanced management
of subfields allows interesting search results. With regard to the last
example above: all the works about the painting of a single painter
are retrieved by searching the value “pittura” in the field 600 $x of
UNIMARC, that is to say the search of a topic as subdivision ($x) of
a personal heading (field 600).
Classification systems
In classification systems – a quick glance – unique entities (or
class of one) usually have no dedicated notation, as the concept
of uniqueness is the opposite of the plurality that a class implies,
and there should be no notation for a class of one, even though
exceptionally it can be the case. For example, in Dewey Decimal
Classification William Shakespeare has his class number, due to the
literary warrant requiring the distinct classification of his works;
and, in religion, single gods, personalities and sacred texts may
have their own class numbers assigned. Usually a unique entity
is classed together with other unique (and not unique) entities of
the same kind, in a class collecting them without distinction. In a
hierarchical-enumerative system, a unique entity can be classed in
different classes depending on the context in which it is involved, as
it happens to common concepts; for example, in different disciplines.
It has a place in a class or another, but it cannot be retrieved individ-
ually, as it is neither marked nor named in its own. Except that the
system allows to add a proper name to the class number, functioning
as a verbal extension to specify that the exact subject in that class is
that person, as in Universal Decimal Classification (e.g., 1(091)MON-
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TAIGNE = Philosophy: History: Montaigne). Any unique entity is
located in the semantic context corresponding to the theme of the
work about him or her, even if different in different works. Unique
entities are scattered and contextualised like common concepts, but,
having no name or number on their own, they are dissolved and
reduced to the level of the concepts that are too specific to have a
dedicated number in the classification. Once the element identifying
the individual is removed, the question about the meaningfulness
is dropped as well: the meaning is the same as that of the assigned
class. In DDC, the example of Gian Lorenzo Bernini has generic
solutions with 720.92 or 730.92 or other numbers convenient for the
attributes he receives in the classified works. Moreover, following
the teaching of Ranganathan, a class of one cannot exist, because
even the most specific class may always be subdivided, depending
on the specific boundaries of the discourses about it. If assigned
classes, like proper names, have mental referents, it is neither diffi-
cult nor unreal to divide them without breaking the unit of the entity,
simply by choosing some aspects (a sort of whole-part or possessor-
property relationship) or adding connections with other concepts
that limit the scope (syntactic relationships). In the same way, in
subject headings languages, a proper name refers to a named entity,
but it is also the term to collect a set of narrower topics related like
specific parts of the subject (e.g. particular periods of a person’s life,
sectors of his activity, subdivisions of a geographic area, chapters of
a work...) and other subjects related with the named entity (e.g. the
works created by a person, the theories she or he elaborated, events
she or he attended ...).
4707E-15
P. Buizza, Indexing concepts and/or named entities
Beyond indexing
Taking a glance beyond subject indexing, some interesting im-
plications may be mentioned. If a proper name for a named entity
(person, collective body or work) is used in indexing systems with
a catagorical meaning consisting in its mental referent – that is the
mental image of the referent in the real world – its value and func-
tion are different from those the same name has as an access point
in descriptive cataloguing where the mere denotating function is
performed. Besides this, if the mental referent is theoretically open
to receive almost any assertion, this means that each mental referent
cuts out a particular profile of the named entity, based on assertions
actually adopted. The value and the function of the name are like-
wise different if, in indexing languages, the semantic isolation of
named entities is covered by instance relationships or by a classifi-
catory context, while in cataloguing the same entities exist without
any link to anything else. These not merely conceptual differences
should be considered when systems are set up for storing and re-
trieving information. The undifferentiated searching by author and
subject, which inserts a modern version of the dictionary catalogue
into OPACs, bears the advantages of global visions on named enti-
ties. But the informative advantage is real if it is accompanied by
clearness, otherwise it risks to cause confusion. Creating nominal
and semantic access points, maintaining their distinction and their
independent consistence with the respective functions, is the base for
the effectiveness of both of them. The same is true for the searching
functions, mainly if assigned indexing is supplemented by derived
indexing and full text search, with or without hidden algorithms to
increase the so called ‘relevance’ of results. In the field of informa-
tion extraction in particular, the Named Entities Recognition (NER,
or Named Entities Recognition and Classification, NERC) has be-
come matter of study and a reason to develop tools for the automatic
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recognition of named entities. Without going into this theme, it must
be noticed at least that, searching in full texts in natural languages,
it must be considered that a proper name could have very different
functions from that of denoting its referent. It can act as metaphor or
metonymy, per antonomasia, even an antonymic function, as well
as be exposed to the plurality of attributions in case of homonymy.
In this sense, as the referent may change from time to time, these
cases should be called proprial lemmas instead of proper names,
as it happens at lexical level. Therefore they go out of our survey,
which is limited to assigned indexing, but they cannot be avoided
in studies including derived indexing and in automatic information
extraction. Nevertheless, mentioning the ambiguity in the use of
proper names/propial lemmas in natural languages confirms that
different uses of the same word are to be treated in different ways.
To conclude, what allows proper names to be inserted into a
semantically organised net is their function of mental referent for
the unique entities that they name; not in the same way as definite
concepts, but for the set of assertions actually attributed to them. A
clear distinction between concepts and named entities is useful to
understand their place between individuality and contextualisation,
and to adopt proper names in indexing and in controlled vocabular-
ies, as well as for the relation between nominal and semantic access
points, for the consideration of proper names in derived indexing
and in full text information retrieval.
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ABSTRACT: Starting from a semantic rather than form a morphological point of view,
the essay examines the problem of the meaning of proper names, with contributions
coming from the philosophy of language and the semantic linguistics. Individual
entities are explored: the way they are isolated in the thread of subjects, the illustrative
relation, and the classification treatment. The deep differences between concepts and
called entities suggest to declare them specifically in a theoretical way, and to adopt
devices that lead to uniform but noticeable results in information retrieval systems.
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